


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The AVALON HILL

GENERAL

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The AVALON HILL **GENERAL**

... a losing venture published bi-monthly pretty close to the first day of January, March, May, July, September, and November.

The *General* is edited and published by The Avalon Hill Company almost solely for the cultural edification of the serious game aficionado. It also helps sell our merchandise, too.

Articles from subscribers are considered for publication at the whim and fancy of members of our erudite editorial staff and company baseball team. To merit consideration, articles must be typewritten double-spaced and not exceed 1,000 words. Accompanying examples and diagrams must be drawn in black or red ink. Payment for accepted articles is made according to the dictates of the voting subscribers.

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Avalon Hill Philosophy - Part 21

The Last Six

With this issue, *The General* enters its seventh year of publication. Prior to the advent of *The General*, very few wargame publications existed, and those that were in business catered strictly to the table-top and miniatures crowd. Probably the magazine of greatest longevity is Donald Featherstone's fine Wargamer's Newsletter currently in its 94th monthly issue. Devoted almost exclusively to table-top wargaming, Avalon Hill articles appear only infrequently and then only as passing references. For all intents and purposes, then, *The General* was a first. Mark the date of its first issue — May 1964 — as a milestone in the advancement of Avalon Hill wargaming.

To a great degree the advent of *The General* fostered the publication of the many other magazines now vying for the wargamer's interest — and dollar. (See Infiltrator's Column for capsule reviews of the more popular magazines.)

Other milestones have occurred along the way. And let us take you back to recount some of those milestones and how they have contributed to the burgeoning interest that, despite rising anti-war sentiment, is rapidly reaching capacity proportions as far as Avalon Hill's production capabilities are concerned. (The tremendous consumer demand for Kriegspiel has outstripped our ability to keep up with its production to the disappointment of many who are still awaiting fulfillment of their mail orders.)

Volume 1, No. 1 (May 1964) is no longer available. To many a collector's item. We really don't know why, it was a terrible issue. But in all fairness to the staff, there really wasn't much available in the way of material. Besides, at its inception we didn't have the slightest idea the type of individuals that would be subscribing. Naturally, requests for individual issues outdistanced the number of subscriptions. The first issue featured a "newspaper format" of a mere 12 pages. And at one buck, literary thievery of a most blatant sort. Curiously enough, the customers kept coming back for more... they either didn't believe the first issue, or we had ironically hit upon an appeal of sorts that had been dormant all along. Sort of like Thomas Edison's embarrassed pleading of "speak, speak I say" to his invention only to see it merely light up.

It wasn't until Volume 2, No. 5 (January 1966) did wargamers really come out into the open. No longer did the fanatics exhort in the joys of their hobby in the safely obscure confines of their attics. Instead, wargaming came out into the open with the "official approval" of Warner Brothers. It was Warner Brothers that proposed to Avalon Hill a joint-promotional program featuring the new Cinerama Movie, *Battle of the Bulge*, where promotional literature on both the movie and the Avalon Hill game of the same name was exhibited everywhere. Even Drive-in-Theatres participated in the promotion which was featured by a contest whereby movies goers were eligible for prizes including hundreds of Avalon Hill games. The promotional theme, "See the Movie, Play the Game" was certainly a milestone of monumental proportions.

Expansion of the literary end featured Vol. 3, No. 1 (May 1966). Here, the magazine went to

16 pages and featured an expanded Opponents Wanted section. The NFFF Games Bureau and its *The Gamesletter* (see Infiltrators) was already in its second year. And just emerging from its cocoon was AHKS (Avalon Hill Intercontinental Kriegspiel Society) for the express purpose of providing adult gamesmanship by mail among the over-25er's of all nations. Probably the most popular series of articles ever to appear in *The General* began in this volume as "The Principles of War for the AH Wargamer," running for approximately 7 issues. Authors Myron Brundage and Captain M. J. Frankwicz shaped the wargaming profile of a large number of converts with this series. Announcement of a Wargame Club index was made in this issue, becoming a permanent feature when the listing of retail outlets was discontinued. Ironic as it seems now, the issue also featured the first literary effort of Scott Duncan with his "Are AH Games and *The General* Doomed" article. Small wonder that the demand for this issue quickly surpassed the supply (and is completely out of stock) as are Vol. 1, Nos. 1,2,3, 4, and 6.)

While otherwise a non-descript issue, Vol. 3, No. 5 unassumingly brought to the attention of Avalon Hill several gentlemen who were to exert tremendous influence on the future of wargaming; S/Sgt. Chris Wagner and Henry Bodenstedt. At this point in history, both were locking horns over a play-by-mail game of Stalingrad, a cover-story feature that dealt appropriately with re-fighting the battle of Stalingrad, then in its 25th anniversary. An outgrowth of this contest was the Wagner-Bodenstedt partnership that began publishing Strategy & Tactics Magazine. Bodenstedt handled the stateside business while maintaining a very popular hobby center for all wargame accessories in Adelphia, New Jersey. S/Sgt. Wagner handled the "publishing" end. The press of business placed demands on Bodenstedt's time to the extent where he had to sell out his share. When S/Sgt. Wagner received his discharge, he decided to handle the entire magazine himself. At this point, Chris Wagner was contributing as much to the testing of Avalon Hill games, particularly 1914, as he was to publishing S & T. While management at Avalon Hill was not always in agreement with the policies and philosophies of S & T, there was a genuine enthusiasm for S & T on the part of Avalon Hill. This brief resume does not do justice to the outstanding contribution Chris Wagner made; suffice it to say that he easily earns the accolade of being included among the top three persons most responsible for furthering the art of wargaming.

The following issue, Vol. 3, No. 6 introduced Jutland, the game researched by another tireless contributor, James F. Dunnigan, and publisher in his own right. Dunnigan was the man behind *Kampf*, a series of historical pamphlets that in time provided the data substantiating the design and research elements of the "Test Series Games" that are offered currently through S & T Magazine. It is this same dedicated historian who retrieved S & T from its under-capitalized state and is responsible for the brand new, face-lifted

COVER STORY

Never let it be said that Damian Housman's Military Strategy Club was over-awed with the prospect of tackling the boys from what's-its-name on the Hudson. Well, maybe a little awed to the extent that, to play it safe, they invited the West Pointers to battle it out on the home grounds of St. John's University in Jamaica, New York.

The Cadets, suitably chauffeured in an Army Limousine, arrived for battle at St. John's Hall on Saturday, March 7, 1970, leaving the following day, Sunday, on the short end of a 5 to 4 count. Accompanied by their West Point advisor, Major Bell, the cadets had reached a 3 to 3 impasse at the close of Saturday session, the tie broken late Sunday afternoon while a gallery of 30 shouted encouragement (and other suitable epithets). Plans are already underway for a return engagement at the Point during which time rounds against several other college teams plus an exhibition against the famous Computer Wargame will be on tap. For now, let's hear it for the victorious St. John's Military Strategy Club.

editions of S & T.

Who can recall how the IFW got its start? Readers of Vol. 4, No. 3 (Sept-Oct 1967) will remember. The cover story of this issue pictures members who initiated the very first Wargamers Convention. Sad to relate, the Malvern, Pennsylvania event was pretty much of a flop despite the presence of some VIPs including Colonel Edgar Owen and Lt. Col. George P. Schneider. The organization was then under the guiding hand of William Speer whose efforts in this direction set the example for the highly successful Lake Geneva Conventions to come.

Vol. 4, No. 4 (Nov-Dec 1967) was the first issue printed on the "slick" stock, not too monumental in itself other than to indicate that it was felt the magazine needed improving. A greater demand for improvement was in the literary content itself, Avalon Hill making a move in the right direction with Vol. 4, No. 6 (Mar-April 1968) with the addition of a feature entitled, "Wargamer's Clinic" which got down to the nitty-gritty of actual tactical applications of what was presented in the "Principles of War" series. The issue also announced that grand game of all — 1914 — "the panacea for all game buffs." While 1914 was not a game to be whipped off on a lunch hour, those that did relegate proper time towards it agree that it certainly "told it like it was" in reference to World War I warfare. It was the game, however, that divided the game aficionados into two distinct groups: the historical camp and the playability buffs. By this issue, wargame clubs galore were being formed, 29 new clubs being listed in this issue as a supplement to the initial listing printed in the previous Jan-Feb 1968 issue. The formation of new clubs continued to soar to the extent where this listing developed into another regular feature of *The General*.

Meanwhile, out on the west coast where affluency is often two years behind, the Spartan Neutral League was bringing order out of west coast wargaming chaos. As reported in that milestone issue of Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sept-Oct 1968) one Russell Powell emerged as "the unsung hero" by investing his time and money into a belief that there was a place in wargaming for a democratic club to act as a service organization for all of the small splinter groups sputtering in the sea of disorganization. The Spartan Neutral League has undergone a great number of philoso-



The Russell Powell, Inc., display table at 1969 Spartan International Convention. R.P.I. is wargame merchandise center for All Spartan members.

phical changes since its modest start back in 1966, emerging today as Spartan International — the second largest wargame federation behind the IFW. It is, however, the only wargame service organization that is duly incorporated providing the benefit, among other things, of state approval to conduct prize-money tournaments. Put a white hat on Russell Powell.

Following on the heels was Vol. 5, No. 4 (Nov-Dec 1968) reporting on the 1st Lake Geneva Convention — another wargaming milestone, significant in that it was the first *successful* convention ever held. Participants traveled all the way from Oregon and New England to attend. A great deal of press coverage ballyhooed the two-day affair that was chaired by gameonoclast Gary Gygax under the auspices of the IFW. Also effective in the Nov-Dec issue was the inclusion of the Letters to the Editor page as a regular feature; a feature to act as a permanent sounding board for subscribers with hangups of any nature.

Vol. 5, No. 5 (Jan-Feb 1969) was significant for two reasons: 1) it introduced the C&O/B&O Game of Railroad, a marketing vehicle that proved beyond the shadow of a doubt the importance of title-appeal and packaging. The new game, actually warmed-over Dispatcher, converted the sales of Dispatcher from a dilatory 600 to 700 a year to 13,000. 2) a conversion to setting copy by IBM Selectric increased the contents of *The General* 22%. Thus, in its five year existence *The General* went from a 12-page "newspaper" wide-character format to a 16-page glossy-stock condensed-type format — all without increasing the subscription rates despite the fact that the cost-of-production index rose approximately 21.5% over that 5-year period.

Vol. 5, No. 6 (Mar-April 1969) keynoted growth of wargames at retail level. Eaton's Department Store in Toronto, The Hobby Shop in Knoxville, Tennessee, and Continental Hobbies in Freehold, New Jersey, had conducted window-displays and "game-ins" of Avalon Hill merchandise. The latter outlet, Continental Hobbies, brought back into wargame focus Henry Bodendstedt whose contributions to wargaming have been numerous and varied almost since the date of Avalon Hill's first introductions. Another new feature appearing semi-regularly was the "Club of the Month" column, accolade in this particular issue went to Donald Greenwood's P.O.W. (Pennsylvania's Organized Wargamers) for their efforts in promoting wargaming. Their highly praised newsletter (see *Infiltrator's*) is Panzerfaust Magazine.

Vol. 6, No. 4 (Nov-Dec 1969) recapped the IFW's 2nd annual Lake Geneva Convention; another two-day affair more successful than even the first one. A cover montage and the inside spread of this issue recorded pictorially the great appeal conventions of this nature have to the wargame buff. The annual Lake Geneva affair, perhaps more than any other single event, has set the standard for a multitude of wargame conventions yet to come. Two of the biggies have been mentioned briefly in another section of this issue. Because they will be milestones of their own, it behooves us to devote the final paragraphs of this article to elaborating on what attendees can expect to benefit from these two major conventions.



Attendees at 2nd Annual Lake Geneva Convention, sponsored by IFW, muse over a typical tactical exercise in one of many held in the horticultural Hall at the famous Summer resort.

MIL CON II

Co-sponsored by Spartan International, the IFW, and the MSC of St. John's University, the university will be the site of a two-day convention and exhibition July 11 and 12, 1970. At the convention one will be able to see the exhibits of the companies, clubs, and individuals which make up the world of wargaming. Participants will also be able to compete in tournaments of AH games as well as with Diplomacy, military and naval miniatures and Test Series Games by S & T. Prizes and refreshments will be provided at the university which is within easy access by car, plane, train and bus. There is no charge for those wishing to exhibit their merchandise with only a modest attendance fee required. Overnight accommodations will be arranged by the host organization, St. John's Military Strategy Club, upon receipt of your intentions well enough in advance. Write to MSC, St. John's U, Dean of Students Office, Box 56, Grand Central & Utopia Parkways, Jamaica, N.Y. 11432.

LAKE GENEVA

The 3rd annual Lake Geneva Convention will be conducted on similar lines. Attendance here will be free to IFW members, but a modest charge to non-members. The Saturday, August 22nd events, are scheduled time-wise beginning with a 7:30 AM Dawn Patrol game of Fight in the Skies. At 9:30 AM, an auction of wargaming memorabilia followed by various time slots devoted to all sorts of wargaming action. Over \$100 worth of prizes will be given away in the two-day event planned once again at the Horticultural Hall in beautiful, downtown Lake Geneva which is noted as a Summer resort town. If you plan to attend contact President Len Lakofka, 1806 N. Richmond Street, Chicago, Illinois 60647.

As milestones go, the Summer of '70 will go down in wargaming history as a memorable one. *The General* pledges its assistance to each and every organization whose contributions past and present have been responsible for the tremendous growth wargaming has experienced in the 6-year existence of this magazine.

For Want of a Horseshoe Nail

by 1/Lt. Harry Roach, USAF

We welcome 1/Lt. Harry Roach into the camaraderie of our ever evolving literary command. Lt. Roach is a Commissary Officer in the "Amerikansche Luftwaffe." With 20 months yet to serve, it appears he will have the time (and hopefully the inclination) to become a regular contributor to these pages. Formerly a History Major at Lafayette, he probably knows well that of which he speaks . . .

After playing Avalon Hill type games for several years and watching them evolve from simple forms such as Afrika Korps into the complexities of Blitzkrieg, Anzio and 1914, it is apparent to me that the goal of this evolution has been greater realism, albeit at the expense of speed and simplicity. Factors involving supply, weather, transport, partial casualties, etc., have been introduced in an attempt to impart into board games a more broad-based duplication of wartime reality. Still other factors could be added: propoganda, labor troubles or political unrest at home, inter-service rivalries, even a technological development factor — i.e. Italian mechanized units in AK can't move every fourth turn due to mechanical breakdowns. There could even be a "bureaucracy factor" — a 1, 2, or 3 means emergency requests for troops or ammunition are delayed two turns by government red tape.

These factors may add to the broader realities of warfare, but do nothing to the actual combat other than slow it down (a genuine aspect of warfare not particularly relished by boardgamers). The player must consider more aspects of strategic warfare, master more complicated rules and accomplish more steps before engaging in combat (the "staff work" of real war), but then the same old combat portion takes place, governed by the same old CRT, a table of chances dependent solely upon strength ratios. The tactical vagaries of warfare are hardly accounted for, other than terrain. Avalon-Hill games go to the better strategist, the better administrator. In fact, in those such as Blitz, one practically needs an administrative officer or exec to handle the "added realism factors." Other than mistakes by the player himself, little is left to chance. Good strategic planning is and should be most vital, but the old fluke "For want of a horseshoe nail . . . the kingdom was lost" has been given short shrift in the evolution of rules for board games, which have become more like the Army's idealized war game exercises than real warfare.

My main point of all this is that more unknowns should be incorporated into board-games at the tactical level to further simulate reality. There are already enough variables at the strategic level. Results should not be based solely on strategic staff work and strength ratios. Actions such as the defense of the Hougamont farm at Waterloo, McClellan's indecision at Antietam, the flight of the XI Corps at Gettys-

burg, the initiative of Sergeant Major Rubarth of the 10th Panzers in crossing the Meuse into France in 1940, and the valiant defense by the French Brigade at Bir Hakeim should be considered at least somewhat.

I see three possibilities for the incorporation of tactical variables: Surprise, Command & Control, and what I call "The Horseshoe Factor." The lack of surprise has been a major weakness in boardgames — a player can see all of his opponent's dispositions, movements and unit strengths. Attempts to overcome this have not been very successful — the invisible Japanese units on Guadalcanal greatly reduced playability and the overturned units in 1914 added little to the outcome of the battle, although that can be excused in a game of continental scope. Surprise was a key factor in many battles yet is almost impossible to achieve in a face-to-face board game. Thus, I have written it off as a playable possibility. The remaining two possibilities are more readily adaptable.

Command & Control is crucial at all levels of warfare but is barely used in board games for the simple reason that the player is the general, the platoon leader, and the rifleman all in one. Thus a possible weak link, an opportunity for chance, is eliminated. It can be reinstated by a Command & Control Factor Chart that might apply in certain games or at least during certain time frames. It would represent the tenuous communications between the Army C.O. (the player) and his subordinates (the pieces). Communications breakdowns often happened in battle, particularly prior to WWII and the advent of widespread field radio use. "Misinterpretation" of directives still plagues armies of today. I have used Waterloo as an example in the following chart:

COMMAND & CONTROL CHART — FRENCH

Die Roll	June 16th	June 17th	June 18th PM
		June 18th AM	
1	X	X	1/2
2	1/2	X	1/2
3	—	1/2	—
4	—	—	—
5	—	—	—
6	—	—	—

X = unit does nothing

1/2 = unit moves half the distance directed

To exercise this option, players must first decide to what level control must reach. Rolling the C&C Factor for each unit would greatly hinder playability, so I suggest using Corps HQ as the basic control link. The following rules would apply:

1. Corps integrity must be maintained.
2. All divisions must be within 6 squares of their Corps HQ. If units exceed this distance they are considered detached units directly responsible

to Army HQ and must be given a separate roll of the die. Players must agree to a maximum number of detached units beforehand, the fewer the better.

3. The C&C Chart applies only to Corps whose HQ are more than 6 squares from the Napoleon HQ piece on June 16th & 18th. It applies to all Corps on the 17th. This represents a breakthrough of command rather than control. Napoleon gave little or no command on the 17th due either to indecision or a severe case of hemorrhoids!!

4. After the French player decides what his move is to be, he announces same to P-A-A player. He then rolls the die for each Corps and detached units more than 6 squares from Army HQ (for all on the 17th & AM 18th). Those units in Corps rolling an X do not move (dead messengers or cowardly officers). Those rolling 1/2 move only halfway to their objectives (confused officers). Other units must complete their announced moves or attacks, even if critical supporting units failed to move (Brave but uninformed officers)!!

This option could be admirably fitted to many existing games, including a resurrected Chancellorsville, and would allow the playing of many new games that heretofore would have been unplayable because a strength ratio imbalance was not offset by poor C&C on one side as happened in the actual battle — Alexander the Great, Antietam, France 1940, etc. The Rommel factor in AK and the Napoleon factor in Leipzig are a step in this direction but do not carry the idea far enough. The proposed "idiocy factor" in the revised 1914 is more to the point.

My final suggestion to improve the tactical end of boardgaming is the "horseshoe factor" or "hero syndrome." Incredible bravery, initiative or cowardice often play a key role in battle and should be brought into play once or twice in the course of a game. I suggest that, oh, say once, in the course of play, a player should be allowed to declare the units on some critical square that is under attack as "heroes," after the attacker has moved but before the CRT is rolled. The defender then rolls the die on the "Hero" table. A roll of 1 or 2 doubles the defender's odds on the CRT for that particular combat. The same could be applied to the attacker. Once during a game he could declare certain attacking units as possessing "superinitiative" or elan and a roll of 1 or 2 doubles the attacker's strength. There would also be a "Coward" 2 table. Once during the game the attacker could declare certain critical defenders "cowards" in the face of perhaps 3-1 odds or better. He'd then roll the die. With a roll of 1 or 2 the defenders would panic 3 squares to the rear before the CRT was even rolled. Attackers would then occupy the hastily vacated square before the CRT battle, perhaps altering the odds of other battles.

Critics might claim that "heroes and cowards" should be totally arbitrary, calling for a roll of the die each turn and each battle until one turns up. However, whenever heroes and cowards turn up, history usually manages to have "the right man in the right place at the right time." All others go unnoticed. Hence, I would allow the player to be a "deus ex machina" and pick the time and place for his heroes and cowards to appear.

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Concealed Movement Madness

by William J.M. Gilbert

Now that G-Canal has accentuated the problem more and more of us are going to be tinkering with various methods of concealed movement. The following is ideally suited for FTF; the administration is fairly simple but it requires three players who are well versed in PBM and, optimally, three game boards.

I. Decide under what conditions enemy units can be "seen." G-Canal does this for you but otherwise this is entirely up to your own sense of originality and will vary by game and (perhaps) by unit. Three suggestions: a) each unit can see 4 squares in good weather, 2 in foul, b) each unit can see only those units it can attack using BMF without road bonuses, c) side with air superiority can see 6 squares side without only 3-4 squares.

II. Players set up their boards — preferably in different rooms. In "Surprise Attack" games another option is for the initial attacker to observe both boards being set up. At the start BLUE places only blue units on his board, RED places only red units on his. Both fill out PBM OB sheets and give them to the umpire.

III. The umpire uses the OB sheets to set up the "Master Board" (MB) and then umpire relays to RED and BLUE (directly on the OB sheet is best, we have found) which opposing units can be seen. Players then place discovered units on their own boards and play continues.

IV. Combats are resolved in the usual fashion. Attacker apportions battles as he sees fit although there may be some nasty "discovered" battles. You must decide what to do about illegal moves by dint of discovery. Suggestions as follows: a) move terminates at point of last possible legal move, b) secondary routes may be spelled out, c) matter is left to umpire's discretion. Whatever you decide option "c" is the best for a reasonable game.

V. *Very important:* The MB is *always correct*. Even when the umpire has clearly misplaced units or failed to properly announce discoveries. This serves to introduce an uncertainty principle more in keeping with the actualities of war, i.e. just because you order a unit to a particular location is no guarantee that it will ever get there... in fact, depending on the skill of the umpire, you may lose contact with some of your own units (if you are playing some sort of variant involving headquarters units). For added realism the umpire could roll two dice and on snake-eyes deliberately not move or mis-move a unit!

VI. Games tend to be a bit longer than usual so the following suggestions are offered. a) time limit on moves, such as ten minutes... or the use of a chess clock, b) alter the victory conditions: The best way to do this is to allow the umpire to call the game after the sixth complete move. The umpire will inform a player he is about to call the game against him and that player will be allowed to plead his case without appeal. (This aspect can be very exciting... especially when you are in what you consider to be in an absolutely commanding position and the game is not being called in your favor... leading you to believe that either the umpire is a dolt, is unreasonably prejudiced against you... or there is some massive, unseen threat about which you had better start pondering.)

VII. Usually the umpire (or umpires) have as much or more enjoyment than the players. He is the only one who can fully appreciate what is going on... and not infrequently he is acting in a God-role... which many people find satisfying.

Analysis of Terrain

by Lt. James M. Crawford

As in warfare, terrain plays an important — sometimes decisive — roll in war-games. Obviously, the wargamer who can best utilize the terrain he encounters will have a decided advantage over his opponent.

Also as in war, the main problem of the wargamer regarding terrain, is his decision-making process. How does he decide the value of terrain and its possible uses? The best way is through the use of the key "word" OCOKA.

OCOKA stands for Observation and Fields of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Key Terrain and Avenues of Approach. The following is a short explanation of how to employ these principles in a wargame.

Observation and Fields of Fire is almost self-explanatory. In games with hidden movement — such as Gettysburg, Tactics II and Guadalcanal — the possession of certain terrain features gives one the advantage of being able to observe certain areas that otherwise might not be observed. The wargamer should determine what terrain features offer this advantage and then take appropriate action to insure the use of this terrain. Fields of Fire pertains mostly to miniatures regarding terrain that might mask the fires of a wargamer's weapons system. For example, a tank is basically a direct fire system and is not really effective firing over hills or through heavily wooded areas.

Cover and Concealment is actually an integral part of Observation and Fields of Fire. In relation to games such as Avalon Hill's, this principle has its most meaning regarding terrain that will allow the wargamer the capability to move his units unobserved by the enemy. The jungles of Guadalcanal offer a perfect example of terrain that provides Cover and Concealment. When speaking of miniatures, a slight variance in definition is

VIII. The system will totally break down unless both players are reasonably fast and *all three* are thoroughly familiar with the PBM set-up.

IX. An interesting variation is achieved if each player has the right to inspect the MB exactly once during the game!

X. S-Grad and AK are good bets. AK because of the high mobility. S-Grad because Germans can better conceal their objectives (i.e. stacking the panzers behind a screen of Rumanians!) and CCCP can effectively use strong concealed secondary lines to sucker German strength into dead-ends. W-Loo is the most realistic, but, in many ways, the most difficult to administer.

XI. An acceptable but time-consuming variation allows attacker two movement portions... any unit having an unwelcome discovery in the first portion may retreat one square along the line of advance and any units not moved in the first portion may be moved in the second.

XII. I volunteer my services to any pair of players who cannot find an umpire and who are willing to find their ways to my pad.

William J.M. Gilbert
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needed. Here, Concealment means just that — terrain that will conceal your troops from the enemy's sight. Cover, on the other hand, means terrain that will provide protection from the enemy's ballistic capabilities even though it does not inherently protect units from being observed.

Obstacles refers to terrain that will hinder both fire and movement or either one of these elements, of your and your enemy's units. A good example of a terrain obstacle is the several interlocking ridge lines between the Our River and Bastogne. The U.S. player can use this terrain as quite an effective obstacle to a direct German thrust toward Bastogne.

Key Terrain can be defined as any terrain which will give one side a decided advantage over the other. An excellent example of Key Terrain is in Monte Cassino. Anyone who has played Anzio knows this only too well. On top of a mountain and behind a river, which triples the defense factor of the defender, is certainly to be classified as key terrain. From this position the Germans can hold up an Allied advance on Rome for months.

Finally, Avenues of Approach are routes that an Army will use to travel from one point to another. Bulge offers an excellent example of clearly defined Avenues of Approach. The three east-west road systems are the avenues of approach the Germans must use, because of supply restrictions, to reach the Meuse River.

I hope that OCOKA will help you to make better use of terrain in your future games. Good luck and good hunting.

Jim Crawford
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Keep Your Eyes on the Prize and Hold

by Alan Augenbraun

At the start of *The Battle of the Bulge*, the German player, as usual, finds himself in command of superior forces. In numbers of units alone, the Germans have a 5-2 advantage over the Americans; factor-wise, the Germans enjoy an even greater 3-1 edge over the meager U.S. force. Further, the Americans are tied down to permanent starting positions while the Germans have relative freedom of deployment. All of this plus two or three major holes in the American line should amount to a German victory, but this is not always the case.

The German player most probably loses his battle because he fails to follow the first maxim of battlefield strategy: "Stick to your objective." The German goal lies across the Meuse, and, to achieve it, the German commander must fight his way past stubborn American units over very difficult terrain. Obviously, the only way to do this is, in the words of the folksong, to "keep your eyes on the prize and hold on." The German player will never win if he allows himself to get bogged down on a tactical level by trying to eliminate enemy units rather than outmaneuver them. A direct frontal assault on American positions will allow U.S. units to fall back to easily defended areas, making German progress that much more difficult.

What then must the German do? To put it simply, he must plan his strategy and execute it without any unnecessary deviations. Ultimately, the German must cross the Meuse. To achieve this, he must breach the American line and split the enemy forces into two widely separated groups on the northern and southern edges of the battle area. This will prevent the flow of American reinforcements from north and south from uniting in a single powerful force and will allow the German an easy route to victory.

A careful study of the terrain and the American deployment will reveal the following strategic objectives which the German player should accomplish if he wants to win. Because it is almost impossible to effect every objective, it will be up to the individual German commander to determine how far — and where — he wants to go with his offensive. Actual tactical deployment will be his decision as well.

PRIMARY OBJECTIVES — Breaching American Defenses

1. The St. Vith-Losheim road must be cut to isolate 106/422, 423. These units should be surrounded and engaged.

2. The flow of reinforcements to St. Vith by the U.S. 99th and 2nd Infantry Divisions should be blocked by holding SS9. Obtaining a victory over 2/38 at RR-7 and advancing to that square will prevent the 2nd Division from moving up to Malmédy. This move will tie up these vital U.S. forces.

3. The road junction at 00-20 should be taken

to cut the Clervaux-St. Vith road, thereby blocking reinforcements from the south to the endangered St. Vith.

4. Clervaux, isolated from the north by Objective No. 3 above, should also be isolated from the south by interjecting units between 28/110, 112 and 28/109. A victory against this latter regiment will allow access to Clervaux and will also threaten encirclement of the three brigades of the 9th Armored and the 4th Infantry units farther south.

5. If possible, the Wiltz-Clervaux road should be cut to prevent further reinforcement of Clervaux.

6. Vianden should be taken to secure the German southern flank. The road between UU-31 and UU-25 should be protected from an advance by the U.S. 4th Infantry.

SECONDARY OBJECTIVES — Splitting American Forces

7. The 14th Armored Cavalry should be engaged and surrounded to clear the westward passage.

8. The German commander must decide whether he wants to eliminate or simply contain the U.S. units in the extreme northeast corner of the board. Elimination will mean a tough fight

because the U.S. infantry is dug in and because the rough terrain precludes effective maneuvering. Containment will tie up these forces while allowing the German to thrust westward to Trois Ponts and northwestward to Spa.

9. St. Vith should be taken to further isolate the 99th and 2nd Infantry and to clear the road to Houffalize.

10. The road junction at 00-18 should be taken to cut the retreat route to Houffalize.

11. The attacks against the 9th Armored at Vianden, 28/109 at 00-27, and against Clervaux and the infiltration south of St. Vith will set up a three-pronged attack on Bastogne, an important supply and communication center for both sides.

12. With the American line breached and his forces separated, the German should regroup his armor between Houffalize and Trois Ponts and culminate his attack by driving towards the Meuse via the Werbomon-Andenne and La Roche-Hotton-Marche roads.

In short, the German must exploit the two major holes in the American line — one between Elsenborn and St. Vith and the other between Vianden and Clervaux — and go on to cut the Aywaille-Manhay-Houffalize Bastogne-Martelange road in its midsection between Houffalize and Manhay. If the German remembers to make wise use of his armor and infantry and if he protects his flanks and supply lines from American counterattacks, he should have no trouble winning the Battle of the Bulge.

In combat, knowledge and execution more of strategy rather than tactics are what separates the amateur from the professional. Similarly, in wargaming, it is the seasoned campaigner who, with an eye on the strategic objectives and perseverance in working towards those goals, will carry the field and the victory that goes with it.

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Invade Belgium, or Switzerland?

by Larry Custead

After playing several games of 1914, one may notice that two distinct and opposing German Strategies begin to emerge. The conflict centers between those who feel that immediate invasion of Belgium is the only road to victory; and those who would rather invade Switzerland before they would even think of invading Belgium. I have found that the road to the greatest German victory lies in combining both these forms and thus achieving the "best of all possible games". To do this you must place all your initial German forces entirely on the Franco-German border between Luxembourg and Switzerland, and then send the maximum forces that can be spared to the East; 175 or ever 245 factors. (These should be made up of as many 5-8-3's and Landwehrs as feasible, to conserve 7-12-3s.) Then sit back and await a decision in the East. I said sit back, but

don't relax! During this period, every effort must be exerted to capture the southern economic squares in France, and generally wear down the French army, as it will be enjoying a slight margin of superiority. You may also, if you wish, attempt a drive through Southern Belgium, but take care not to cross the Meuse, and admit the French to Belgium. Here, your objective should be the capture of Rheims and the encirclement of Verdun. Just don't Relax, Ever!

By this time, something should have happened in the East, and unless your luck is exceptionally bad, you should obtain either 50 or 75 victory points. While these points are, of course, extremely helpful, the most important thing now becomes the units arriving back from the East. The key is to place each and every rearriving unit along the Belgian border in preparation for a massive assault. While waiting for the rest of your

units to come back from the East, the attrition in the South must be even further stepped up, to tie down as many French units as possible in relieving each other, and prevent their transfer to the North.

Finally, when all scheduled units have arrived back in the West (probably around the 19th or 20th turn, which still leaves you half as much time again as the entire Standard Game, and certainly enough time to ensure a successful invasion) you are ready to begin a huge invasion of Belgium. If you have enough forces, including plenty of cavalry, and especially if you also jump off from behind Namur, it is essentially a simple matter to capture all of Belgium and destroy the entire Belgian army.

From this point, you have almost reached your limit, and your offensive will be grinding to a halt, for if your opponent has any skill at all, you will most likely never get anywhere near the Channel Ports. However, it is often possible to force your way into the northern economic squares around Lille, by the simple expedient of forcing the French player to stretch his line to untenable or precarious lengths, and then attacking it piece-meal in as many places as possible, until the weakened line loses all cohesion through a painful lack of full-strength units.

This final maneuver should net a final total of something close to 250 points, to the French 50. While this strategy does not guarantee a decisive victory every time, it certainly comes far closer than many others, and it has several distinct advantages. Firstly, it allows you to send more units to the East than could ever possibly be spared had an immediate Belgian invasion been planned, thus yielding more victory points for the German from the East than usual, and still enabling the German player to achieve all possible objectives in Belgium. Secondly, it creates a couple of very distinct headaches for the French, who has probably placed several Corps along the Belgian border in the North, and thus has probably left his extreme Southern Flank relatively weak. He must then slowly transfer these Northern units south for several turns. But a larger headache occurs when he attempts to meet your renewed threat of huge troop concentrations along the Belgian border and sections of the Meuse. He must weaken his line by disengaging units to send North, while all German invading units are arriving as reinforcements, and detract nothing from the southern line, thus allowing the German to exploit fully any weak spots the French must create. And lastly, this strategy delays the entrance of the BEF until the latest possible date, a psychological factor which should not be overlooked, despite its seeming unimportance.

One final point – Never, I repeat, Never invade Luxembourg! To make this endeavor practicable, it would have to yield a minimum of some 25 points, versus the loss of 5 which is all it ever provides. Only an utterly masochistic idiot would ever invade Luxembourg (cf; Moltke's invasion of Luxembourg in the original campaign)

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Plan of the Month

On the Defense of France

by Tyrone Bomba



I'm certain you've noticed that since *D-Day* was first released, we've been literally "bombarded" with German set-ups which claim much but in reality do little.

So, in an attempt to halt all of his needless frustration over opening troop disposition, I present here my "final solution." That is, a set-up which allows the Allied player nothing but 1 to 1 odds on all of the coastal squares from the dyke to Bordeaux.

Further, this set-up forces the allied player to attack at these unfavorable odds if he wants to play any sort of productive game. Besides the worthless south of France, the only squares left undefended are Q-33 and 34, which lie on the northern tip of the Normandy Peninsula. Also, should the American manage to successfully exploit his 30% chance of getting ashore, there are sufficient forces in *all* areas with which to mount immediate and decisive counter-thrusts.

I have presented the set-up in sections, listing all of the forces in a particular invasion area under a specific heading, each of which is followed by commentary where felt necessary.

BASIC STRATEGY – This set-up *does not* allow for withdrawal from the beaches in reaction to the first invasion, its users must be prepared to make *D-Day* into a "mini-game" by resolving the entire campaign on the beaches in the first few turns.

The first invasion must at all costs be defeated, totally. Sufficient forces are available to launch turn one counter-attacks of at least 2 to 1 magnitude. Allied presence is permissible, though, on the northern tip of the Normandy Peninsula, south of France, and any fortress square. In the last case, the German must make sure the Ally is bottled up.

After the first invasion has been quelled and the second launched, you are then free to take up whatever inland defensive positions you wish. If done correctly though, you should be able to smash *both* invasions right on the beach.

One thing more, it is advisable to give the Ally full SAC capability, otherwise this set-up becomes about 99% invincible. (This set-up is meant, of course, for the '65 tourny version.)

RESERVES – All of them are placed in Northern Germany, but spread them out on the four stard squares as much as possible so they all can't be SACed into oblivion on turn 1.

These units shall move down the coast "relieving" other units of comparable strength to move on toward the battle area in the same turn. This method of movement, if effect, allows you to move units two or three times a turn.

NORTH SEA – 1 1-2-2 D-10, 1 HQ H-12, 1 HQ H-14, 1 5-5-3 F-13, 1 5-5-4 G-14, 2 1-2-2 H-15, 1 4-4-3 H-15, 2 3-4-3 I-16, 1 1-2-2 I-16, 1 4-4-3 J-17, 1 3-4-3 J-17, 1 1-2-2 J-17.

This area is so well defended that most Allied players won't even consider it as an invasion site. But should he attack, and get ashore, bottle up the islands and counter attack any of his units on plain terrain squares.

PAS DE CALAIS – 1 1-2-2 L-20, 1 4-4-3 L-20, 1 1-2-2 L-21, 3-4-3 L-21, 1 4-4-4 N-21, 1 1-2-2 in each fortress, 1 HQ O-24, 1 HQ Q-25, 1 1-2-2 O-25, 1 4-4-3 O-25, 1 1-2-2 P-26, 1 3-4-3 P-26, 2 1-2-2 Q-27.

This is undoubtedly the hardest area for the German to defend because of the great amount of troops that the Ally has available to him. But good counter attacks are easily achieved against units on clear terrain, but should your opponent get into Ostend or Dieppe you will be forced to counter attack at whatever odds you can get or risk loosing the game right there.

LE HAVRE – 1 4-4-4 S-28, 1 4-4-4 S-29, 2 1-2-2 R-29, 1 3-4-3 R-29, 1 1-2-2 R-30.

NORMANDY – 1 HQ U-32, 1 HQ V-34, 1 4-4-3 S-32, 2 1-2-2 S-33, 1 7-7-4 S-34.

If he comes ashore east of the Vire River he must be defended, but otherwise it is advisable to merely set-up the Vire River/Avranches defence line. If you feel it necessary, you may fall back to the Orne River defence line but it takes a great many more troops to hold that area successfully.

BRITTANY – 1 4-4-3 V-36, 1 1-2-2 V-38, 1 HQ W-39, 3 1-2-2 V-39, 1 1-2-2 V-40, 1 5-5-4 V-40, 1 3-3-3 X-42, 1 HQ W-43, 1 1-2-2 V-43, 1 1-2-2 U-42, 1 7-7-4 U-42.

BAY OF BISCAY – 1 1-2-2 AA-41, 1 4-4-4 BB-40, 1 1-2-2 EE-42, 1 6-6-4 EE-42, 2 1-2-2 FF-41, 1 1-2-2 II-42, 1 6-6-4 II-42, 1 1-2-2 LL-44, 1 1-1-3 LL-44.

If the landings come in one of the three cities you must counterattack, but if he lands on clear terrain, and favorable odds are not available, merely pull back and defend the three major supply points. (Brittany's defences might be deleted to do this.)

SOUTH OF FRANCE – No forces.

And that, gentlemen, is it. Not 100% infalible, but it will give you victory at least two thirds of the time. Good Luck!

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Italy . . . I

by David Cogswell

The campaign is Italy and the date is January IV. The present situation finds the Axis forces concentrated at the Gothic Line after a massive retreat with the Allied units stretched out to the south in pursuit. The events which proceeded this situation found the Allies landing in the Gulf of Gaeta at Mondragone. After a three week, spirited fight for Naples, the Allies struck the Liri valley and the Cassino line. A determined advance coupled with a lack of German fortifications came within a hairbreadth, or rather a hillock, of smashing this position but the Germans held on and eventually solidified their line. There now followed a strengthening of the Sicilian forces and German expectancy of a second invasion. It came on January II in the Po valley plain at Rimini. This begins the thread of the proposed hypothesis.

From the Allied point of view, the Rimini invasion was foremost opportunism but with a careful eye to insurancery. The sensitivity felt by the Axis for this beach need not be understated and it was this reaction which figured so prominently in Allied plans. Allied shipping potential allowed secondary invasions up to and including February IV. With the second Allied invasion initiated January II, February IV was in actuality the first and last chance for a third Allied invasion before the summer of 1944. This third invasion was the strategic crux of the entire Allied winter offensive.

The areas proposed for the concluding Allied invasion were the Apian plain at Rome or the broad plain straddling Route 1 at Civitavecchia. The force available upon which to draw for this invasion was a host of ten Allied line divisions, all at full strength. The main objectives assigned to this army were the cracking of the Cassino positions and the destroying of as many German units as possible in the insuing retreat. The speed in which these developments were put into motion was of most importance and the action which was to facilitate them in this facet was the prior invasion at Rimini. Small by necessity, this invasion was regarded as a reconnaissance in force rather than a full fledged assault. If the few divisions committed in this move could remain on the beach for the six week landing duration, the German reserves used to contain or crush this force would leave the Cassino positions with only the units needed to actually maintain that line.

Seemingly every contingent pertinent to Allied strategic aims was set and the second Allied invasion of January II was launched. The only initial resistance was from a Jaeger regiment which was quickly silenced. Once ashore, however, German reaction was overwhelmingly under anticipated. Not only did the Axis reserve speed north to the threatened combat zone but the entire Cassino line was abandoned along with the girth of Italy. In one week the Allies had swept the enemy from 2/3 of the peninsula. The large gain was, of course, strictly a German decision and perhaps a fatal one at that. The invasion at Rimini was swept into the sea and the German commander had a wealth of units with which to hold his Gothic Line. Now we have reached the question upon which all that has proceeded has come to rely. What would be the essence of the stage about to begin?

The Allied forces had reacted in a solid though orthodox manner, abandoning the future third invasion motif and funneling their reserved strength onto the mainland through Naples. This tact afforded them an interval of mass movement with a subsequent assault on the Axis positions in approximately three weeks. The German commander, however, enjoyed a slight respite from the dictates of the present. His forces had reached their defense positions though as yet they had not been positioned for battle. It is this wedge of choice upon which this narrative is directed.

A classical response in a parallel situation would be a strong forward line, backed by a potent mobile reserve. For a situation such as this, the German forces are aptly endowed. However, upon closer examination, the realities of the present are in serious ambivalence with the prescribed approach. A closer comparison of the orders of battle of each side graphically reveals the inequity. The Allied army, its present ground strength and immediate potential, number; thirteen infantry divisions, six infantry brigades, three armoured divisions and three armoured brigades. This totals to seventy-nine combined offensive points. Arrayed against this are; thirteen wehrmacht infantry divisions, seven panzer and panzer grenadiers divisions, three luftwaffe divisions (including H.G.) and a handful of panzer brigades*, all of which have an offensive total of ninety-seven. Since only a minimum of nine wehrmacht infantry divisions are needed to secure the Gothic Line, the German commander has at his disposal an offensive force totaling fourteen field divisions, ten of which are panzers or luftwaffe. Not only does the German commander hold sufficient force to counter Allied line assaults but holds the force needed to turn to a full scale offensive.

This abrupt turn of events comes hard on truly a spectacular Allied advance. It is March I and all of Italy south of Florence is held. But nonetheless, the preponderance of offensive might lies with the Axis. In consequence, one of the most disastrous strategy's the Axis can employ is the strong line/mobile reserve mentioned previously. This tactic allows the Allied force the opportunity to concentrate on German salient positions while securing the bulk of his line on advantageous terrain. This strategy allows him to successfully endure the spring of 1944 while his fortunes are multiplied in the reinforced early summer campaign that follows. A strong German assault, well coordinated and ruthlessly followed through, would find the Allied forces reeling and holding on during the dark spring months rather than duping the Axis into continuing what was now the Allied preponderance myth.

This myth, however, is a powerful device and it is to every advantage that the Allied player employ it. In the before mentioned circumstances the final outcome pivoted on the success of this myth. The Allied forces created an entrenched offense, which aided by its reinforcement compliment and efficient supply system, promulgated the final act offensive irresistible. The Gothic Line was pummeled and pushed in upon itself, the last ramparts freed by the Allied air strike of early May.

The essence of the campaign related here is that a previously valid supposition continued to wield devastating influence long after the foundations of that supposition had ceased to exist.

Italy . . . II

The Italian campaign, excluding the toe and heel which are represented by the "south end" option, accommodates a total of thirteen sea invasion areas. The strategic implications of these areas are vast and they are, to the Allied player, the most important lever at his disposal with which to radically alter the Italian military situation. They (the landing zones) introduce at once strategic subtleties to the campaign, which by comparison present the overt ground assault as time and strength consuming brutalities. The quickest way to introduce these influences into play is to form an amphibious reserve on Sicily. The formulation of such a reserve at once directs the Axis command to either take counter measures or risk 'over extending' his command on the front line. The failure to take such steps by the Allied commander, however, seriously limits his influences and restricts his abilities in the campaign. The importance of securing a reserve, therefore, is of the first magnitude and the stating of this principle so early in this article is indicative of the weight it holds.

The choosing of the initial landing area by the Allies is a unique blending of Strategic and tactical considerations. The importance of considerations make the first landing by far the most prominent. Where the Allies land, however, decides which strategic possibilities have been chosen and it is the acting upon these possibilities that future amphibious threats depend. Considering the invasion areas individually, many hold a wealth of possibilities and these warrant a detailed inquiry.

Salerno: This is the southern most invasion area and as such it affords the Allies the most ground to be taken. The over riding attribute of this beach, however, is its practical invincibility. All the pre-requisites for a successful invasion are found here, including Allied air superiority. The initial lift is the highest in Italy, the terrain is suitable for first week defense and the First Invasion Reaction (FIR) is negligible. The prox-



*this includes the independent Tiger and Panther battalions, invaluable for assault principally for their unlimited stacking ability.

imity of the beach also facilitates early south end contact* and here lies one of the principle faults of Salerno. Naples, the principle supply port of all of Italy, lies six long squares from the northern most Salerno beach square and a competent German command can construct a stubborn 'makeshift' line anchored on Vesuvio. The inherent danger in the development of this situation is the time afforded the Axis with which to fortify Cassino. The link-up with the southern command eliminates any interacting two front development and the complete German commitment is a direct result. (One other effect of a Salerno landing is the negating of any Italian assistance, though in this particular area their involvement would be minimal.)

The East coast: These landing zones, Termoli and Pescara in the south and Rimini in the north, share serious short comings as first invasion sites. All these areas have a small initial lift with Rimini the most critically endowed with ten. The first week ashore defense positions are also slight, especially Pescara with no terrain available and the vulnerability of Rimini from released Northern Italy units. Termoli alone has some cover but depending on troop placement a German containment is easily provided by the Sangro, Trigno, Biferno or Fortore rivers. A landing here also necessitates a hard fight across the peninsula if Naples is desired. The FIR results are identical with Salerno, however, except for the previously mentioned Rimini implications.

*The deployment of south end units is essential and apparent will be the consternation to have failed to place them and suddenly need them "this turn."

Gulf of Naples and Mondragone: These two invasion areas flank the port of Naples and as such the fate of each is closely tied to that city. One factor of great influence on an invasion here is the placing of several German units. The 71st Nebelwerfer brigade and the Panzer Parachute Hermann Goring division can be located either in Naples, on Vesuvio or in Caserta. If Naples is left unoccupied, or held only with the Nebelwerfer, it can obviously be taken the first week. If Hermann Goring, however, is placed in Naples and Nebelwerfer on Vesuvio, a landing at Naples will be cramped for maneuvering space. True, Hermann Goring can be surrounded with a commando unit, but the best possible odds are 1 to 1, Naples (and needing a die roll of 1) or 2 to 1, Mondragone (needing a 1 or a 2). These odds should be acceptable to a German commander and the boon of denying the Allies Naples (at least temporarily) lend credence to the risk.

Another attribute of a Naples/Mondragone landing is the chance of Italian defection. The possibility of delaying the 1st Parachute at Foggia is most beneficial with other Italian units playing lesser and varying roles. The FIR is also slight at these areas but of major strategic value is the proximity of the beach heads to the Cassino line. Naples is five squares from the first positions and Mondragone actually has a slice of the line, i.e. the Garigliano.

Terracina: The narrow landing strip here affords excellent defensive terrain the first week ashore, has an adequate Initial Lift and a suitable port right within the beach head. The FIR is the same as Mondragone as is the Italian defection chance. Terracina is surrounded, however, by highly defensive terrain. With some care, a landing here can be reduced to an enclave by a

capable German commander. The force needed to insure this containment, however, will also leave the German with inadequate forces to block the south end advance. The coordinating of these two forces opens to the Allied commander several tantalizing avenues of approach, the most obvious reward being a rather cheap taking of the Cassino line. (Not an insignificant by-product of this situation is the possibility of taking Naples by default.)

Rome: This nine space invasion area, the longest in Italy, holds much promise for either side; if one word were to describe an invasion here, turbulent would do. A successful Allied landing in Rome soundly outflanks the Cassino line and also holds the communications hub of Italy. The denying of this centre to the Axis command seriously disrupts his subsequent counter measures.

Rome is the first invasion opportunity which favors the German commander in regard to FIR results. Any Allied invasion at Rome, or further north on the west coast, has to take into account a possible influx into the German command of ten combat divisions, six of which are top rate. This rapid build-up spans only three weeks but these three weeks are critical to a Rome invasion. For the first time the need to crush an Allied assault is crucial to the German command. The addition of these FIR units enable him to pursue this course. The remoteness of south end influences further facilitate this move.



An Allied commander is presented with several immediate variables at Rome and the most important is where he lands. The Initial Lift of the Rome beach is small and the topography of the area together intensify the need for judicious placement. The German 2nd Parachute division at Practica di Mare splits the invasion beach in half and dictates Allied flank extremities. The best odds that can be mustered against this unit is a 2 to 1.

The southern portion of this invasion area consists of Anzio, Can Mussolini and the Albano hills. If a southern landing is made these hills must be compromised. The breaching of the Can Mussolini will also facilitate matters. Anzio is an adequate port for local supply and the securing of this is inseparable with this landing.

An Allied assault north of Practica di Mare places Allied units in or adjacent to Rome. This will secure them fighter superiority, if held, though little else. A parachute assault on Rome is advantageous in this case also; it's above the Initial Lift, it strengthens the Allied ashore force and it brings the Italians to the Allied side. Delay is crucial for an Allied build-up and these can play an important part. One other ingredient of a Rome invasion is the adding to the milieu of the 1st and 9th U.S. infantry divisions. These are excellent units if they were permitted to play a part.

Civitavecchia: The need to repulse or strictly contain an Allied assault is continued here, as it is for all invasion areas north of Terracina. An Allied landing here suffers, as at Rome, with a low BU and Cap but, again as at Rome, an adequate port is included. The sea port of Civitavecchia is protected by the only defensive topography of the beach head, a mountain directly behind the town. One added Allied advantage at Civitavecchia is the disrupting of Axis southern forces from being committed; Italian defection effectively ties up Rome for at least a week. The FIR and Italian defection odds are identical to Rome's.

Invasion areas north of Civitavecchia . . . west coast: These four invasion areas all have either a low IL, a low BU, a low Cap, or no local port. The mouth of the Ombrone and Cecina have all of these 'qualities.' In addition they boast no supporting terrain and enjoy a tight (two square) beach. The invasion area at Livorno has a low IL, BU and Cap but it does contain an excellent port, fair defensive terrain and a long beach. The proximity to the Gothic line is both a benefit and a disadvantage. Initial cover there is excellent but depending on the invasion's success, further penetration will be difficult. An invasion at Genoa gains an excellent port, second only to Naples in Italy, but the practical impossibilities of rapid expansion, coupled with the relative ease of sealing them off, eliminates Genoa as an invasion site in most first invasion plans.

As in all military campaigns, the intentions of the participants and the possible routes open to obtain those intentions, determine the strategic value of any development. In Italy, especially with the amphibious element, the intent is clear and the routes are available. These routes can be as many-sided and as devastating as the verve of the participants allow. The element of surprise is an integral part of this campaign but of even further use is the employment of a pin. Always carefully weighing one's potential, a participant can introduce explicit threats to the status quo, the starkness of which at times magnifies its effect. The remarkable situation found in "Italy . . ." dramatically portray this development. (Not the smallest factor contributing to this is the mathematical precision of wargames.)

The rudimentary factors contributing to the creation of this possibility are, of course, essential to its existence. The coordinating of Allied shipping potential, port construction materials, weather, withdrawals and replacement capabilities are as integral to this application as the present tactical and strategic considerations. These points, however, can be quickly evaluated, forming an amalgamated reply to mesh with the latter. It is these, the strategic considerations, which are kindling to this proposed motif.

In some Italian campaigns, opportune possibilities refuse to present themselves. The absence of these does not warrant the abandoning of an effective coercion tact by the Allies. On the contrary, even in ideal situations, or rather in maximum chance return situations, the success of such a move is dependent on the diligence of the participant. It is only with an energetic use of this invasion prerogative that it can exert its true worth. In short, the initiative of the participants in this matter is of far greater importance than in many others.

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On the Trail

by R. Springer

The purpose of this essay suggests a concept to enlarge a player's choice of strategy in Blitzkrieg and the devices for manipulating the play. The powerful influences on types of war, as forward-

ed by Leonard Kanterman, "Economic 'Krieg," (*General*, Sept - Oct '69), is the economy of a nation.

Standard Blitz is a developed war situation in turn one. The following concept opens from a position of peacetime. The devices of play are

carried through the time frame of peace into the time frame of major war.

The initial time frame opens with two mayor powers, their allies, and two neutral countries. The base enabling each player to formulate his strategy is the economic point and the supply factor.

The economic point is a frame work built from terrain squares and city squares. It will be easier to have stockpile point and replacement point categories while handling the economic points. In this time frame then, economic points come from terrain squares representing a set economic worth

The Ardennes

By Jeff Stein

Anyone who is reading this article is probably expecting an article on Bulge; however, this offensive is scheduled for 1914 instead of 1944. By now you have either turned the page in disgust or you are a battle-hardened game nut, who reads the General from cover to cover. Despite what the students of von Schlieffen may think, there are many merits to a German attack in this area.

First, this attack will probably come as a big surprise to the French (as it did in 1940). The majority of French forces will probably be in the South and the North, expecting little action in the center.

Secondly, a central drive will threaten the flanks of the Allied forces both North and South. If the French halt the German advance in the center, a large portion of the German troops can be thrown North in an effort to cut off the Belgian retreat from Liege and Namur (assuming the rest of the army wasn't idle during the earlier portions of the game), or they can be diverted North to force a crossing of the Meuse or to capture the economic squares EE 22, FF 24, and FF 25. There are three major disadvantages to this. Thirdly if the French stabilize the situation early in the campaign and construct a line, the operation must be given up due to the fact that troops can not receive double losses or pushed back. First the early advance is slow. Secondly, the cavalry will receive high losses since they will serve as the spearheads.

The first problem can be alleviated through wise use of railroad movement. The second is bearable in the overall aspect of the war (as we all know, one can lose a skirmish, but win the battle). The third problem can only be solved by changing the rules.

Mechanics of the Offensive

The invading force should consist of at least 12 7-12-3's, 4 5-8-3's, and all of the cavalry. These should be split into a Northern and Southern pincer and placed along the border. The main force should pass through Luxembourg. Two reserve corps should be sent ahead by railroad in an effort to gain a bridgehead over the Meuse. The gap left between these spearheads and the bulk of the armies, should be filled with cavalry.

If the Germans achieve a breakthrough and you roll the dice well, a German victory march in Paris may come a quarter of a century ahead of time.

Jeff Stein
305 N. Goodwin
Urbana, Illinois 61801

Risk at Rome

by Jim Curtis

An Allied first invasion at Rome is very risky to say the least, but if you consider yourself a "daring general" - here goes.

THE LANDING

Unit	Landing	Move	Position
Br. 67 Division	D-41	D-42	D-42
Br. 5 Division	D-41	E-42	E-42
Br. 2SS	D-49	Anzio	E-48
U.S. 45 Division	D-46	D-47	D-47
U.S. 36 Division	D-46	E-46	E-46
U.S. Ranger	D-45	E-44	F-43
82/504 (Para. drop)	F-44	F-43	F-43
82/505 (Para. drop)	F-45	F-44	F-44
82/GI. (Para. drop)	G-44	F-44	F-44

AT TARANTO - the two British Paratroop units
AT MESSINA - British 46 & 56 Divisions, 23 arm. brigade

You attack the 2nd Paratroop division at 1 to 1. You could also use Ariete to attack Frascati at 1 to 2. There is a small chance of eliminating the 2nd division. In any case, you can always evacuate the Br. 2SS brigade out to sea. If the attack calls for a casualty merely invert this brigade and retreat it out to sea. On a roll of 4, you may merely retreat it out to sea. These commandoes go through Anzio so that the Allied player will be able to build a port there if the German forgets to go through this square.

The weak part of this plan is the Rome area. A counterattack here will be limited though because not a whole lot of units will be able to reach here. The Italians will also help foul things up. The British 5 & 78 divisions aren't the strongest units to hold an important flank of the beachhead, but again this is based on the assumption that not many troops will be able to counter-attack here because of distance and Italians.

Lida di Roma must be held. On the second turn build a port there and along with the beach build-up rate, bring in the 1st, 9th and 3rd U.S. divisions. You will probably have to stay on the defensive for a while, but strive to increase your "toe-hold," especially around Lida di Roma.

Keep the pressure on him "down south," always striving for Naples. With two fronts to contain, sooner or later (preferably sooner), something's got'ta give. You are assured of receiving your Optional Troops, while he may not get any of his Invasion Reaction troops. Italian morale is influenced and with a little luck you will be pretty far up the peninsula when time for the first air strike comes around.

Playmates at Tobruch

by Dan Carman

Lest you think that wargaming is strictly a "man's world," the following is the confession of a college student who got soundly trounced by members of the distaff side. The "playmates" are actually female members of his Playmate Club (Infiltrator's Report - Vol. 6, No. 3) listing a Villanova University address. We still think you're putting us on, Dan...

During November, two "playmates" challenged me to a game of Afrika Korps; they taking the allies while I took the Germans. After taking the worst beating of my life, I decided to write this article with the hope that both novice and pro will greatly benefit by it.

Using my winning first move, the results were: the unit at Bengasi was taken at 5-1 surrounded by a 7-7-10 at H-3 and a 4-5-6 at I-3. Then three 2-3-4's ended up on J-3 and two 2-2-4's on K-3. The 2-2-12 and 3-3-10 advanced to K-3, and the Rommel Unit (after moving 22 squares and at the same time giving all initial units between Msus and Mechili. I have found that to get units as fast as possible to T., the fast ones should go across the desert and the slow ones on the road.

The girls then moved the 4-4-7 into T. and pulled out a 2-2-6 to G-23; then took the six 1-1-6's around T. and put them at H-24 and I-26.

After a successful attack on the three H-24's, I brought up the May reinforcements south of Gazala.

The allies next retreated all the remaining forces on G and H Squares to those adjacent to T. and sent two 1-1-6's to Salum.

Having no supply counters, all I could do was to maneuver some heavy armor and both recon battalions to the south and southeast of T.

Afterwards, receiving their June reinforcements and noting that T. was under siege, they did the following: first, the 1-1-6's were pulled back to Salum. After this, the six strong units left were split into two piles of equal strength. Three of these remained in T. while the possibly win. If the game had continued, the November infantry and armored infantry would have been cut down at Agheila.

Dan Carman
Box 1118
Villanova U., Pa. 19085

per country. The terrain value, stockpiled points, of each country is Blue-180; Red-180; Yellow-40; Orange-15; Green, White, and Black-20 each.

The *supply capacity* of each country, during the initial time frame, is four combat factors per city square. This reduction will develop later but this supply is perpetual and divorced from economic points.

The *buffer countries*, above, are identified by their capital cities: Yellow has V-20; Orange has WW-32; Green has BB-31; White has NN-33; Black has OO-40. The use of buffer zone countries as allies and neutrals creates a situation of diplomacy. Forced and compromising situations are implied whereby Yellow is the ally of Red, Orange and Black are the allies of Blue, and White and Green are neutrals. Neutrality does not encompass boarder penalties, home armies, or city capture. Their economic stockpiles stand and, as incentive, players will handle transgression as they see it. Notice, also, the position of allies not being adjacent to their major power discourages easy troop movement overland. Along this line then, the quixotic nature of diplomacy is protecting the exposed allies by providing them with additional forces. Major powers transport forces to their allies via air and/or sea routes subject to the game's "Battle Manual." Each ally already has a standing army; Yellow has 24 factors in red infantry; Orange has 12 factors and Black 16 factors in blue infantry (thus boarder penalties are replaced). The allies repay for protection by supplying the additional forces when the means are available.

Brush fire war is the emphasis of aggression during this initial time frame. To develop an example, should a force from Black and Yellow invade White, the supply capacity in Yellow and Black only is increased to 12 combat factors per city square on the turn of invasion. At this same time, each city square of these countries begin to produce one economic point and each capital city square produces two economic points. These points are stockpile points of that particular country. The use of these stockpile points will be noted later. If then, all cities in White lie in the zone of control Black's units and Yellow is forced out of White (for one complete turn), this alone brings automatic forfeit of White's stockpile points to the stockpile of Black. Then complete capture of White is to take its cities. Taking and holding alien cities means removing defending units and occupy. There are no assumed armies in this concept, so no city capture table. Enemy and neutral cities must be occupied; then, White now produces supply and econ. pts to add to the stockpile of Black. Setting back a city square's production 12 supply factors by strategic bombing is the only way to equally set back that one or two point economic production until services are restored.

It is appreciated that a minor ally's troops become involved once out of their country. Such troops remain in being through their own supply routes and/or routes from their major ally.

The reduced scales of operations referred to thus far govern game conduct. To conclude this time frame, contingent scales and the position of the mayor countries are set forth. These other scales are for each side. A mayor power and its ally are held to 4 combat factors per turn in air transportation; 16 combat factors per turn in sea movement; combat air operations is 12 factors per turn (no nuclear weapons); 4 economic points for replacements per turn which start in their

own home country; supply (as noted) per city square is 4 combat factors... minor countries (neutrals' cities in invaders' control) engaged in brush fire war increase supply to 12 per city square plus 1 economic point per same each turn. Unengaged countries' (always Red & Blue) supply rates stay at 4 during this time frame. Of their aggregate supply Red and Blue may each support 16 combat factors over sea routes and an added 12 may be supported over air routes to friendly receiving centers; minor allies may draw from this capability. Each country (less neutrals) may draw from their stockpile 15 points per turn in peacetime (replac. pt. excluded). Units of a major country transported to a minor may exceed its own supply limits if the minor has a surplus supply after supplying their own troops.

Purchasing power of the economic point is common to each country. First, a grease pencil (crayon), one red and one black, will enable you to indicate new cities, roads, and forts which are facilities each country may build from their stockpile. A city and road square are used the same as those in the standard game and become permanent fixtures. A fort square may be dismantled by ground units... its function has the defensive benefits of cities, serves as a port facility on coasts, and/or an air base for two air factors. The cost of a city square on clear terrain, coast, or river is 4 economic points and on rough terrain or woods is 6 economic points. A fort square can be built on any terrain square for one economic point. Roads may be built at one economic point per 4 road squares over clear terrain and river squares (not crossing the river). It costs one economic point per 2 road squares in rough terrain, woods, or crossing a river in its square. No roads may be built over lakes. A troop counter must be on the site of a fort square during construction whereas cities and roads do not. No new construction may take place within two squares of an enemy unit.

Combat unit cost, in first or last time frame, is the smallest combat factor of any unit to its least cost in economic points. The infantry, marine, artillery, and rangers cost one economic point to 2 combat factors; artillery based on defense value. Armor, airborne, and armored airborne cost one economic point to 1 combat factor. Aircraft cost two economic points to 1 combat factor. This cost relation is designed down to the use of substitute counters.

Prior to turn one of the game based on the above information, Red and Blue assemble their standing army. At this time 70 points maximum from each stockpile may be spent for what ever units a player wants. Points not spent at this time remain in their stockpile and thereafter are subject to the game's limits. Red and Blue are allotted a reserve army of 50 economic points of which 25 may be spent during the initial time frame according to the game's limits (15 pts/turn). A budget of stockpile points during the first time frame for Red and Blue's 180 point worth would be 70 to the standing army, 50 to the reserve army, and 60 to facilities.

The *State of War* condition is the last time frame of the game. It does not start on a set turn or have a definite duration any more than the first time frame. At any time a player can start major war by declaring it over causes in his country, his allies, or neutrals. A player starts a major war (automatically) when he exceeds the limit of spending 15 economic points on a turn; replacement category excluded. War is automatic,

also, if he spends more than 25 economic points for his reserve army. Note that minor countries and neutrals do not contribute to cause war but indirectly from a major country's meddling. Too, a player declaring a State of War does not mean the other player must acknowledge or go on wartime scales of operation. Staying in peacetime attitude means maintaining peacetime limits of operations.

The major power declaring war is not penalized or rewarded. The major power causing automatic war is penalized with disfavor in world relations by forfeit of 5 economic stockpile points while the opposing major power is favored by 10 economic stockpile points if the foul within the turn is recognized (by employing X units/facilities, you have exceeded the 15 point limit). If the foul is not declared by the opposing major power neither power is held to the above affects in world relations.

The first complete turn after war has started and thereafter, the *increased scales* of operations apply only to the power bloc initiating the war and only to the power bloc in opposition when they reciprocate the decree or foul of automatic war. Note here that in fact it is increased scales to countries not already waging brush fire war. Therefore, the increase to wartime limits as distributed per turn are: air transport - 12 combat factors & supply by such 24; sea movement - 40 combat factors & supply by such 40; combat air operations - 52 combat factors in the air (nuclear weapons employable); replacement points (incorporate with stockpile points) one economic stockpile point for each friendly city square... two such points for capital city square; supply per city square - 12 combat factors; consumption of stockpile points remain at 15 per turn with a violation on every point over, two points go to the opponent (retroactive to exceeding peacetime limit). New and replacement units of a wartime power bloc start from within their major's homeland.

Mobilization begins, at the earliest, the turn after the major war was triggered if the player elects (it may not be needed then). Once a player starts using mobilization, this phase runs through its course. The first turn of mobilization begins with - employment of the remaining reserve army, otherwise - 15 economic points over the above consumption rate. The second turn 25 points more. The third turn 40 points more. The fourth turn 60 points more. The fifth turn, and hereafter, economic stockpile points from all its sources can be spent at 50 points per turn. Within this new limit, these points can be used for new and replacement troop units, city squares, road squares, and forts.

I feel this proposed concept offers as its *key the player*. No two games may turn about the same from start to finish... each player will make sure of it on each new game. He will always be adjusting his fighting force and the disposition of his country; a flexibility unparalleled. The patented strategy engineers will, I should hope, run their paper supply out showing their findings while their opponents, adapt in the media of flexibility, ring them in circles.

I extend appreciation to Leonard Kanterman and Peter I. Menconi who showered me with their pro-&-con and the time of interest they gave which I have applied throughout this essay.

R.B. Springer

Box 53

Irvington, New York 10533

Question Box

Official Avalon Hill Game Clubs...

The clubs listed below supplement the initial listing made in the Jan-Feb 1968 issue. Due to space limitations, we have not repeated any prior listings although many have forwarded us updated information. The purpose of this listing is simply to provide basic information to those readers looking for new clubs.

1914

Q. In 1914, can a hostile unit enter a square with forts on two sides or a detached fort in the center?

A. Yes.

Q. Will sending EB units over a severed intersection allow troops to go through on the other track in the same turn, assuming all unrestricted terrain?

A. Yes.

Q. In the "Artillery-Infantry" attack on forts there are 14 defense factors for the "entire fortress zone". How are these 14 defense factors destroyed?

A. The 14 are destroyed when the fort is destroyed (when a 1 is rolled.)

GETTYSBURG

Q. The rules state that an artillery unit must face in the same direction as the infantry or cavalry unit it is with. But in the back of the Battle Manual there is a diagram that shows an infantry with an artillery facing diagonally. The explanation says that while the infantry is attacking diagonally the artillery is soaking off to the right. Would you please explain this?

A. In the latter case, the artillery unit would not be "protected".

ANZIO

Q. Assume the Germans are attacking a British infantry division. There is a British replacement unit on the same square as the defending British unit. If the "SRT" calls for the British to lose one or more steps can the allied player remove the replacement unit one step?

A. Yes.

Q. If a unit can advance after combat, can it use a primary road through rough terrain and only count each square as one square? How about on a secondary road?

A. Yes to both questions.

Q. Must German replacements and reinforcements, when they arrive in the north, come on a road square — or can they come in on any edge square?

A. Any square.

Q. *Must* the allies invade somewhere on the September II, 1943 turn?

A. Yes.

MIDWAY

Q. Does the Invasion of Midway begin the turn the Atago lands on Midway or the turn after?

A. The same turn.

BULGE:

Q. May fractions of moves be carried over from one road to another?

A. Yes. For example, a unit may move four on a road, three squares across country to another road, and then move one more square on that road (same road or different road).

CLUB	PRESIDENT	MEMBERSHIP
Ice Cap Command 529 East St. Juneau, Alaska 99801	David Peltó	4
OOPS 200 West Midway Drive, Lot 134 Anaheim, California 92805	Larry Reilly III	6
San Diego Model Wargamers P.O. Box 11383 San Diego, California 92111	Richard Kapsart	26
The Gentlemen's Agreement 783 Wedgewood Drive San Jose, California 95123	Robert Partenen	6
15th Light Panzer c/o Neil Kingsley 135 Jonothan Road New Canaan, Connecticut 06840	Tom Gerweck	4
1st Long Range Recon Patrol c/o Denny Sears Box 104 Henry, Illinois 61537	Steve Flinner	7
The Foundation P.O. Box 16094 Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Indiana 46216	O.J. Boyd	?
The Federation Rt 4, Box 151 Festus, Missouri 63028	Paul Pedersen	8
Rensselaer Military Strategy Club Student Union Rensselaer Poly Troy, N. Y. 12181	John C. Lawson	15
The X Brigade 5889 Fourson Drive Cincinnati, Ohio 45238	Mark Wernke	7
The A.E.F. 144 South Bird Road Springfield, Ohio 45505	Larry Aleshire	10
Okinnawa Eggheads 6749 Markwood Worthington, Ohio 43085	Peter Schonitzer	5
Ogden's Vice Squad 1017 Laclair Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15218	Frank Okvic	12
The Cossack Brotherhood Box 215 Missouri City, Texas 77459	Bill Fisher	4
Der Imperial General Staff 5836 Richmond Street Dallas, Texas	Robert Lund	6
The 1,000 912 Main Avenue Nitro, W. Va. 25143	—	27

Club Registration

All Avalon Hill clubs are urged to register officially with The General. Those submitting the following form will be listed in the next issue.

Club Name _____

Mailing Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Name of Newsletter of Magazine (if any) _____

Total Membership _____

President's Signature _____

(Check One:)

This is a first-time registration.

This is an address change, only.

This Issue's Best???

Don't forget to vote on what you consider are the three best articles in this issue . . . record your selections where provided on the Contest Entry Blank below.

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The coupon below is for the benefit of the full-year subscriber. As soon as you have accumulated 4 such coupons, you are entitled to a \$1.00 discount applied to the purchase of any Avalon Hill merchandise; including games, play-by-mail kits, parts, and copies of The General. Each coupon is worth 25 cents. However, to be valid your order must be accompanied by a minimum of 4 coupons (\$1.00's worth) per order. Of course, you may send along any number above the 4 minimum. No photostats please . . .

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MAY-JUNE 1970

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All ads are inserted as a free service to full-year subscribers. Only one ad per subscriber per issue is allowed. Ads will not be repeated from issue to issue, however, subscribers may re-submit the same ad, or new ads, for each succeeding issue. Ads received after the 15th of the month preceding publication will appear in the following issue. No ads will be accepted unless printed on this form.

Contest No. 37

As the U-Boat commander with only four torpedoes left, you must sink the Destroyer on this turn, with the rulebook stipulation that torpedoes may not be fired to the first square to which the Destroyer must move. On the Attack Plan, list the squares to which torpedoes are being fired, the number of torpedoes launched to each square, plus one stock per torpedo. The Destroyer's moves after P5 will be determined by Ampex and the DE chart. CTD will be Monday, June 15, 1970. Winners will be picked from those sinking the destroyer, with ties broken in favor of those hitting the destroyer with the most torpedoes.

Select U-Boat stocks from this group:

- | | | |
|------------|----------|----------|
| Chrysler | Goodyear | Sears |
| Food Fair | I.B.M. | Polaroid |
| Ford | Korvette | Goodrich |
| Gen. Elec. | Motorola | Zenith |

Sales-in-hundreds	Torpedo	Sales-in-hundreds	Destroyer moves to
0	Miss	0	06, O7
1	Miss	1	06, N7
2	Hit	2	06, N6
3	Miss	3	05, N6
4	Miss	4	05, N5
5	Hit	5	05, N4
6	Miss	6	05, Stops
7	Miss	7	04, N4
8	Hit	8	04, N3
9	Miss	9	04, O3

All entries must be postmarked no later than Sunday, June 14, 1970. Ten winners will be

named. All entrants must list what they feel are the three best articles of this issue. This selection has no bearing on the contest results but entries not containing this information will be voided.

		DE		
Q7	Q6		Q4	Q3
P7	P6	P5	P4	P3
O7	O6	O5	O4	O3
N7	N6	N5	N4	N3
M7	M6		M4	M3
		UB		

ATTACK PLAN

Sq.	No. of torp.	Stocks

Headlines of 3 Best Articles:

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____

Letters — Yes, We Get Letters

Sir:

I have been playing "war games" for a bit over six years now and have been a subscriber to your magazine for one year thus far. Having studied Military History in college (and privately) and after almost four years in the Army (the Army Security Agency to be precise), I have concluded that the bulk of your contributors don't know the first thing about war.

So many of the articles printed are poorly researched and are presented so far out of context as to be misleading. I fear that I am in general agreement with Geoff K. Burkman. A great many of your contributors have "if-itis." Their schemes are based on a very peculiar set of circumstances which may occur one time in a million. This in and of itself would not be so bad if the authors knew what and why these circumstances were in existence in the first place, but the simple truth is that they don't. I think your game-oriented contributors would contribute a good deal more to war-gaming if they spent some time analyzing the principles involved in particular situations. Discussions of the "Essential Elements of Information" (i.e.; Weather, Enemy, Terrain and own Troops) as they apply to particular games or situation would greatly improve the quality of war-gaming. Anybody can play a game over and over again until they learn through rote every possible situation involved and thereby win fairly often solely because of familiarity. However, a new game with a new set of situations, he is at a loss. Why? Because he never knew what he was doing or why.

A great many seem to feel that they have "discovered" the secret of victory, that they have the "coup de grace" in their hot little hands. Almost invariably I have been able to find their fundamental ideas in the history of warfare. They should be advised that the road to "victory" is through the study and application of the basics and not in some inane "miracle" plan.

May I add that I have read some of your competition, and I don't think they are any better than "The General." Nor do I wish to imply that all your contributors are as I described above. Some very good articles have appeared in your magazine. While I am sure you have some very good reasons for the present format of articles appearing in "The General," I offer the above comments in the belief that there is always room for improvement.

David R. Schold
Box 7261, USASAFS Hakata
APO San Francisco 96502

Dear Sir:

In the November-December issue of the "General" were two letters of interest to me and others of the 101st Andorran Airborne Naval and Historical Simulation Division. These were: Capt. Thurston's letter, and Mr. Burkman's article; both these letters contain incorrect facts.

In Mr. Thurston's article, he says no ship in history has ever survived more than four torpedo hits. Really, Mr. Thurston, out of what book did you get that information? The Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi each took upwards of thirteen torpedo hits! The American battleship

"West Virginia" took six! Although Yamato and Musashi and Bismarck sunk, it would not be too out of the question to think that they could have survived five had they received no more.

In Mr. Burkman's article, he says that "the R.A.F. no more destroyed the invasion fleet than Stalin was a Nazi". We'll grant him that Stalin was no Nazi, although his policies were as bad if not worse than Hitler's; however "The R.A.F. wrecked the invasion fleet!". While the invasion fleet stood in harbour, the R.A.F. Bomber Command hammered it with one hundred and fifty bombers a night.

Our Sources

Their Finest Hour: Winston S. Churchill
Janes Fighting Ships: 1945 Wartime Losses Section
The Sinking of the Bismarck: William L. Shirer
Aircraft Carrier — The Majestic Weapon: Donald Macintyre

Robert Davidson
101st Andorran Airborne Sim. Div.

Dear Sir:

A few nights ago, while being slowly but efficiently eliminated by my friendly neighborhood enemy at BLITZKRIEG, the following passage came to mind. It is from Stephen Vincent Benet's JOHN BROWNS BODY, and precedes the section on the battle of Bull Run:

If you take a flat map
And move wooden blocks upon it strategically,
The thing looks well, the blocks behave as they should.
The science of war is moving live men like blocks,
And getting the blocks into place at a fixed moment.
But it takes time to mold your men into blocks,
And flat maps turn into country, where creeks and gullies
Hamper your wooden squares. They stick in the brush,
They are tired, and rest; they straggle after ripe blackberries,
And you cannot lift them up in your hands and move them.
It is all so clear on the maps, so clear in the mind,
But the orders are slow, the men in the blocks are slow.
The general loses his stars and the block-men die
In unstrategic defiance of martial law.

Regardless of that I (and my enemy) enjoy the game tremendously, and cannot wait until the day when we understand it well enough to be able to move up to the tournament rules. We could only wish for a more complete and pictorially descriptive Battle Manual. Thank you for the hours of enjoyment you have brought us.

William H. Batchelder
230 Riverside Drive
New York, N.Y., 10025

Dear Sirs:

As regards the "Jutland Rebuttal..." controversy, apparently as good as anything that the British cooked up over the battle itself:

The SMS Prinz Adalbert was crippled by a torpedo from the British submarine E9 in July, 1915. Repaired, it was sent out again, this time to be torpedoed by the E8, which had better luck and sent it to the bottom of the Baltic. This must have been prior to January, 1916, the date that the E8 was recalled to England. (Naval Battles of the First World War by Geoffrey Bennet. Library of Congress Cat. No. 69-12496)

Also, British eyewitnesses to the contrary, no German ship mounting 15-inch guns ever got within a hundred miles of the battle. One fifteen-incher battleship was available, having been completed in March, 1916, but on trials in the Baltic at game time. This was the "Bayern", the first of a new class of German dreadnought, displacing 28,600 tons, with 13.75" belt and turret armor, mounting eight 15" and 16 5.9" guns, speed 22 knots. Adding the "bayern" requires a counter with a hit box total of fourteen — seven fore and aft — a protection factor of 14, and a motion factor of 9. (The "Hindenburg", a battlecruiser essentially similar to the "Lutzow", was not completed until October, 1917.)

Other ships which missed the battle were the British battleships "Emperor of India" (Iron Duke class) "Queen Elizabeth" (similar to "Barham") and "Royal Sovereign" (same as Royal Oak) plus the battlecruiser "Australia" (same as New Zealand) all except the brand-new and uncrewed "Royal Sovereign" undergoing vital repairs. The German Kaiser-class battleship "Konig Albert" also missed out, also in the hands of the dockyards.

For further information, refer to: "From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow", by Arthur J. Marder, Part I — "The Road to War", and "A History of the Modern Battleship Dreadnought", which contains silhouettes and vital statistics on British, French, German, American and Japanese battleships of both world wars.

Stephen J. Lewis
363 Oxford Street
Rochester, New York 14607

Sirs:

This letter is to inform you as to the existence of the 1st UNION JACK COMMANDOS. With headquarters at the UNION JACK BOUTIQUES 91 Bloor Street West, Tro., Ont. and 208 Dundas Street, London, Ont. these clubs are being sponsored through THE UNION JACK BOUTIQUES ADULT GAMES DIVISION. Our present membership stands at 12 in Tro. and 9 in London.

At present a newsletter is being prepared for early spring of 1970, and quarterly thereafter.

Since this is the first time which we as a club have registered with the GENERAL any assistance you may be able to render in publicizing these clubs and an international war gamers convention for early summer 1970 will be held to the utmost. Any other clubs interested in Co-op sponsorship of the above named convention should contact one of the club presidents as soon as possible.

The 1st Union Jack Commandos
Hq-91 Bloor St. W. Hq-208 Dundas St.
Tro., Ont., Canada London, Ont., Canada
Doug Frost, Pres. Laurie K. Freeman, Pres.

Infiltrators Report

1970 WILL BE KNOWN in economic history as the "Year of the Strike." Rumbblings from the game aficionados have let it be known that they are striking for bigger and better tournaments. Here's how their requests are being met: The New Aggressor PBM Naval Tournament, deadline August 25, 1970, entry fee \$3.50 involving Jutland, Bismarck, Midway and possibly U-Boat. Herb Parents, 157 State Street, Zeeland, MI 49464... IFW Anzio Society, cash-prize Anzio Game III tournament, Joseph Alexander, 44 Little Tor Road, New City, N.Y. 10956... Madison Convention, held Saturday June 13, 1970 - 12 noon to 10 PM at the Madison, Wisconsin, Community Center, 16 E. Doty St., sponsored by Wisconsin chapter of the IFW. Admission - \$1.00, contact Bob Reuschlein, 2225 Keyes Avenue, Madison, Wisconsin 53711... \$300 Spartan International Tournament, deadline extended to June 1, 1970, complete info including prize list from Russell Powell, 5820 John Avenue, Long Beach, California 90805... Annual IFW Convention (3rd Annual), Lake Geneva Horticultural Hall August 22 & 23, 1970. Lenard Lakofka, 1806 Richmond Street, Chicago, Illinois 60647... Mil-Con II, St. John's University, Grand Central and Utopia Parkways, Jamaica, N.Y., co-sponsored by Spartan International, IFW, and St. Johns Military Strategy Club, on July 11 and 12, 1970. Damian Housman, Dean of Students Office, Box 56, Grand Central and Utopia, Jamaica 11432. Other tournaments no doubt are in the forming stage, and will be reported on in the next issue upon receipt of the pertinent data.

LITERARY KUDOS to George Phillis, Williamsville, New York, for his "The D-Day Thesis - Conclusion" voted top article of Vol. 6, No. 6. Other outstanding efforts were those of Charles B. Pelto, Lincoln, Nebraska, for "The Pessimists Blitzkrieg," Alan Augenbraun, Brooklyn, New York, for "German Defense of Normandy - Part IV," TM1 William B. Searight, Keyport, Washington, for "19(41)14???", and J. R. Norman Zinkhan, Saskatchewan, Canada, for "Defense Plan III."

WINNERS OF CONTEST No. 36 were those drawn at random from among the 1,177 subscribers (a poor turnout) who took the time and trouble to complete the "Wargamer's Wargaming Poll." They are: Kent Wallace, Wichita, Kansas; John Mensinger, Modesto, California; Wayne Sloop, Vancouver, Washington; Tim Barb, Akron, Ohio; Sidney Kuhn II, New Orleans, Louisiana; Mike Cohen, Montreal, Canada; Kenneth Burke, Billerica, Massachusetts; Jim Curtis, Bartlesville, Oklahoma; Dean Dunman, Olustie, Oklahoma; and Michael Swanson, Watertown, Massachusetts; all of whom received \$6.00 Gift Certificates.

AS A SERVICE to the game aficionado, this column traditionally lists the availability of many other magazines devoted to wargaming. This time we're going one step beyond and list capsule comments from the magazine that is in business for the express purpose of rating wargame periodicals, among other things. Acting as such a clearing house is *The Gamesletter*, Don Miller, Publisher, 12315 Judson Road, Wheaton, Mary-

land 20906. Alphabetically, here's what *The Gamesletter* says: *Canadian Wargamer*, J. Hutchings, 4578 Brentlawn, Burnaby, B.C., Canada, "looks like the Canadians have got themselves a fine gaming 'zine... lots of interesting material... plenty of art..."; *E-Elim*, Dean of Students Office, Box 56, Grand Central and Utopia Parkways, Jamaica, New York 11432, "although primarily AH oriented, there is considerable material for the the general wargamer... consider joining M.S.C. if for no other reason than to get D-Elim."; *Der Lage*, Lewis Pulsipher, Seaton Hall, Box A22, Albion, Michigan, "except for game reviews, of interest only to DDW members. However No. 11 shows signs of becoming a bit more generalized in content."; *Gamer's Guide*, Ken Borecki, 19 Royal Road, Rockville, Center, N.Y., "Purpose is to help the gamer locate opponents, newsletters, tournaments, clubs, conventions, and just about anything else he needs... if you need info on gaming, subscribe."; *International Wargamer*, John Bobeck, 3919 W. 68th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60629, "looks and reads very much like S & T... magazine alone is worth the \$6 annual membership fee for the IFW."; *Panzerfaust*, Donald Greenwood, Box 280, RD NO. 2, Sayre, Pa. 18840, "The most varied, and in a way, the most exciting of the general wargaming magazines... in a close fight with International Wargamer for runnerup to S & T... pricewise, the best buy around."; *Spartan International Monthly*, Russell Powell, 5820 John Avenue, Long Beach, California 90805, "reminds us very much of the excellent Wargamer's Newsletter - does for AH wargaming what W.N. does for table-top gaming. All AH gamers should look into this one."; *Strategy & Tactics*, Poultron Press, Box 396, New York 10009, "a very handsome issue... a bit of a contradiction; it has the best repro of any 'zine, and is a joy to behold... needs more variety, still Poultron Press has only had the 'zine for two issues so let's give them more time..."; *Wargamer's Newsletter*, Don Featherstone, 69 Hill Lane, Southampton, Hampshire, England SO1 5AD, "the magazine for table-top wargamers and military history buffs." No listing of this nature would be complete without an opinion on the opinion-makers, themselves. If you want to know "where it's at," *The Gamesletter* is of inestimable value. Besides informing the public on what is good and bad in the field of magazines (incidentally it lists every magazine printed included special interest pubs and those devoted essentially to non-wargaming) it contains valuable dope on what is available, vignettes and personal resumes on gamesmen of note, plus names and addresses of the Games Bureau Members whose modest dues support the entire project. Accept our word that a subscription to this magazine is an unequivocal must.....

THE 48TH PANZER CORPS is in the news again. Not the historic Corps; but the one whose members make up Mark Teehan's 20-member club emanating from Saint Mary's University in Halifax, Canada. Acting with the same "persuasiveness" as did its real life counterpart, the "Corps" has invaded the news media and TV

stations with a barrage of promotional blasts. Mark himself appears on local TV and talks up a storm. Meanwhile, coverage in all local print media continues to arbor expanding support for AH merchandise in the local game outlets. Among those affected is Del Meister, Bluenose Furniture and Stationers who not only stock the stuff but contributes prize money for the tournaments. Our proverbial stein is raised in salute to all recruits of the 48th Panzers.....

OUR APOLOGIES TO CAPT. RICHARD THURSTON whose article "Combat Results Equilibrated" omitted the decimal CRT tables. Captain Thurston states that he will furnish readers with these tables upon receipt from them of self-addressed envelopes containing first class (or airmail) postage.

WE, INC, of Old Greenwich, Connecticut has come to the notice of the Infiltrator for its fine, quality line of authentic military books. Author of most of the books is a noted historian guaranteeing WE, INC with authentic material. The more popular include "German Army, Navy, Uniforms," "German Aircraft Guns & Cannons of WW II," and "Rise and Fall of the German Airforce" to name a few. Their complete listing, over 17 books pertaining to uniforms and weaponry is available from WE, INC, Box 131, Old Greenwich, Connecticut 06870. Special consideration will be given those who mention *The General* when requesting their brochures.

FRED WINTER, President of IFW's 1914 Game Society, offers unusual services that benefit the novice. Services include "game instruction, matching and third player services" to name a few. Winter's address is 2625 El Rancho Drive, Brookfield, Wisconsin 53005.

TOM WEBSTER, Plainwell, Michigan, one of the IFW members who participated with Avalon Hill at the Chicago Hobby Convention, announces the start of something new: the "Ancient Society" with 20 members dedicated to refighting battles circa 500 B.C. The society's "New Carthage News" with a circulation of 24 isn't exactly what you would call monumental, but you have to start somewhere.

WE SALUTE Alister William Macintyre, Cincinnati, Ohio, as our first 5-year subscriber.

THE DIDACTIC GAME COMPANY, Box 500, Westbury, L.I., New York, represents a major commercial breakthrough in the use of adult games at training seminars. Trading upon the principle that games can be "sugar coated education," the Didactic people provide a program that can be administered either by Didactic or the companies themselves for the express purposes of developing executive skills for company personnel. The games are paper and pencil learning games, manually scored by the participants. They help the participants improve their ability to contribute effectively by stimulating the desire for more knowledge of the subject matter. Equally important is the fact that these games give practice in problem solving and decision making, the latter two areas Time Magazine claims is the major reason why middle age executives become economic drains on their employers.

